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Abstract—Software-defined networking (SDN) is a promising
technology to overcome many challenges in wireless sensor
networks (WSN), particularly with respect to flexibility and
reuse. Conversely, the centralization and the planes’ separation
turn SDNs vulnerable to new security threats in the general
context of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. State-
of-the-art approaches to identify DDoS do not always take into
consideration restrictions in typical WSNs e.g., computational
complexity and power constraints, while further performance
improvement is always a target. The objective of this work is to
propose a lightweight but very efficient DDoS attack detection
approach using change point analysis. Our approach has a high
detection rate and linear complexity, so that it is suitable for
WSNs. We demonstrate the performance of our detector in
software-defined WSNs of 36 and 100 nodes with varying attack
intensity (the number of attackers ranges from 5% to 20% of
nodes). We use change point detectors to monitor anomalies
in two metrics: the data packets delivery rate and the control
packets overhead. Our results show that with increasing intensity
of attack, our approach can achieve a detection rate close to
100% and that the type of attack can also be inferred.
Index Terms—Software-defined networking, intrusion detec-
tion, wireless sensor networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a paradigm that was
devised to simplify network management, avoid configuration
errors and automate infrastructure sharing in wired networks
[1]. The aforementioned benefits motivated the discussion of
combining SDN and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) as a
solution to many WSN challenges, in particular concerning
flexibility and resource reuse [2]. This combination is referred
to as software-defined wireless sensor networks (SDWSN).
The SDWSN approach decouples the control plane from the
data plane and centralizes the control decisions; its main
characteristic is the ability to program the network operation
dynamically [3]. Recent results show that SDWSNs can
perform as well as RPL [4].
On the other hand, the SDN centralization and the planes’
separation turn the network vulnerable to new security threats
(explained in Section II-A), a property that is inadvertently
passed on to SDWSNs. Shielding SDNs from these vulnera-
bilities has already attracted a lot of attention in the literature.
There are proposals to implement attack detection in Internet
of things (IoT) networks using SDN. Sankar and Gurusamy
[5] proposed softhings, an SDN-based IoT framework with
security support. The framework was developed for OpenFlow
[3], which however, limits its use in networks composed of
low-end nodes. The use of support vector machines (SVM)
was proposed to detect control plane attacks; it was shown that
a detection rate of around 96% and 98% could be achieved.
The algorithm was tested in Mininet, simulating scenarios
with only five 5 nodes and considering one node as attacker.
Yin et al. [6] developed the framework SD-IoT, which
includes a security system for DDoS attacks detection, based
on the difference of packets received by the controller. The
difference is calculated using the cosine similarity method.
This mechanism was devised for networks where all the nodes
have periodic communication with the controller, which could
be not optimal for very “restricted” networks with low-end
nodes. Authors tested their proposal through simulations using
Mininet. The network size is not explicitly specified, but is
inferred to be around 50 to 60 nodes.
Overall, in the case of SDWSNs, due to the resource
constraints of the nodes, most of the security mechanisms
designed for non-resource constrained SDNs have to be
adapted or redesigned. This is one of the major challenges
for SDWSN security. Wang et al. [7] proposed an SDWSN
trust management and routing mechanism. They compared
their proposal to SDN-WISE when both networks are under
attack. The focus of the work is on the selective forwarding
attacks and new flow requests. The first attack applies to any
type of WSNs, while the second is specific to SDN. The
mechanism was tested in simulations with 100 nodes, varying
the number of attackers between 5 and 20. Their results show
an attack detection rate between 90% and 96% when 5 nodes
are attackers, and between 60% and 79% when 20 nodes are
attackers.
Considering the limitations of previous works, our main
objective is to propose a mechanism for DDoS detection with,
i) a high detection rate, and, ii) low complexity, so that it
would be suitable for “restricted” networks. To this end, we
propose the employment of change of point analysis [8] [9].
We study two DDoS attacks: a false data flow forwarding
(FDFF) attack, and a false neighbor information (FNI) attack,
chosen to illustrate the proposed algorithm’s capabilities in
the case of specific SDWSN vulnerabilities that exhibit largely
different behavior. Both attacks are explained in Section II-A.
We have tested our approach on the IT-SDN framework1
[4] and our results show that we can detect these attacks
with a detection rate close to 100%, improving the state
of the art; importantly, it is further possible to gain insight
regarding the type of the attack, based on the metric that
provides the quickest detection, a feature, that to the best of
our knowledge, breaks new ground in the domain of DDoS
analysis for SDWSNs.
II. IMPACT OF DDOS ATTACKS IN SDWSNS
A. SDWSN security analysis
The SDN networks security threats are grouped in three
sets [10]: application plane attacks, control plane attacks,
and data plane attacks. Among the three, the control plane
attacks are pointed out as the most high impact and attractive
[10] [11], as the control plane is responsible for the overall
management of the network [12]. This characteristic turns the
control plane prone to distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks. For example, an intruder may flood the network with
flow rule requests, which could lead to an exhaustion of the
controller’s resources. This attack can be intensified using
multiple intruders.
The threats and vulnerabilities explained before also apply
to SDWSN. Moreover, there are specific attacks that can attain
SDWSNs due to resources constraints, for example: in SD-
WSN the forwarding devices have low storage capacity, which
limits the memory assigned for flow tables and buffers. These
constraints make the forwarding devices prone to saturation
attacks. Also, SDWSN networks are characterized for having
a limited bandwidth and low processing power. This means
that a saturation attack can also result in a DoS attack.
Another vulnerability concerns the gateway between the
SDN controller and the WSN. The gateway has a radio module
of limited bandwidth, rendering it a weak link even when the
controller has enough resources to overcome an attack.
For the reasons outlined above, most of the security mecha-
nisms designed for standard SDN networks have to be adapted
or redesigned. This is one of the major challenges for SDWSN
security.
B. Impact of DDoS Attacks on Network Performance
Based on SDWSN specific security vulnerabilities, in a
previous work, we studied the impact of three DDoS attacks
on SDWSN performance [13]. The attacks investigated were:
false flow request (FFR), false data flow forwarding (FDFF),
and false neighbor information (FNI).
The FFR attack aimed at increasing the SDWSN con-
troller’s processing overhead, as well as the packets’ traffic,
thus, increasing the number of collisions. Each attacker sent
multiple flow rule requests to the controller, while the latter
calculated the rule and replied to the request. The impact of
the attack was observed to be negligible. The FDFF attack
followed the FFR attack main idea of sending false flow rule
requests to the controller, however, the execution was based on
1http://www.larc.usp.br/users/cbmargi/www/it-sdn/
using each attacker’s neighbors (benign nodes). Each attacker
sent one data packet to its neighbors tagged with an unknown
flow identifier; as the neighbors did not have a rule to apply
to the packet, they sent a flow request to the controller asking
a rule for the unknown flow identifier. Thus, compared to the
FFR, the intensity of the attack was multiplied by the number
of neighbors. The FDFF attack tripled the number of control
packets in the whole network, but had a minor impact on the
delivery rate. For both control and data packets, the delivery
rate decreased only between 2% and 4%.
In the FNI attack, each attacker intercepted packets contain-
ing neighbor information, modified them with false neighbor
information and forwarded them to the controller. The con-
troller updated the network topology graph using the false
information, and then reconfigured the network with wrong
forwarding rules. Our main results [13] showed that the FNI
attack could double the number of control packets in the whole
network and had a significant impact on the delivery rate. In
the case of the control packets, the delivery rate decreased
between 35% and 50%. In the case of the data packets, the
delivery rate decreased between 20% and 70%.
III. CHANGE POINT DETECTION ALGORITHM FOR DDOS
The study in [13] provided valuable insight regarding the
impact of the FDFF and FNI DDoS attacks on the two metrics
under observation, i.e., the mean data packet delivery rate and
the mean control packets overhead. Building on this analysis,
we formulate the attack detection problem as a hypothesis
test, examining whether a change has occurred in the mean
value of the time series of the metrics involved.
In [8] a change point (CP) detection algorithm was pro-
posed to estimate in real-time the existence, the number, the
magnitude and the direction of changes in a time series. To
attain these objectives, the algorithm combined (i) off-line and
on-line CP schemes; (ii) an improved measurements window
segmentation heuristic for the detection of multiple CPs; and
(iii) a variation of the moving average convergence divergence
(MACD) indicator to detect the direction of changes. The
main elements of the algorithm are explained in the following.
A. Basic Off-line Approach
The proposed algorithm tests the constancy of the mean
values of the time series through a hypothesis test; the null
hypothesis is defined as H0 : µ1 = · · · = µN against the
alternative H1 : µ1 = · · · = µk 6= µk+1 = · · · = µN
indicating a change point (CP) at instance k ∈ {1, N}, where
N denotes the length the time series and µi the mean value
of the time series up to instance i.
Assuming that each sample of the time series X1, ..., XN
can be written as, Xn = µn + Yn, 1 6 n 6 N , a non-
parametric CUSUM test statistic can be developed to identify
changes in µ [14]; the test statistic can be viewed as a max-
type procedure,
M = max
16n6N
CTn Ω̂
−1
N Cn, (1)
where the parameter Cn is the typical CUSUM,
Cn =
1√
N
(
n∑
i=1
Xi − n
N
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
, (2)
and Ω̂N is the estimator of the asymptotic covarianceΩ, where
Ω =
∞∑
s=−∞
Cov (XnXn−s). (3)
To estimate Ω, the Bartlett estimator was employed [8].
Finally, the critical values for several significance levels α
were computed using Monte Carlo simulations. The last step
is to estimate, if H0 fails, the unknown CP, under H1, given
by:
ĉp =
1
N
argmax
16n6N
M. (4)
B. On-line Phase
The on-line scheme includes an on-line CUSUM algorithm
for the detection of a change in the mean and a MACD indi-
cator to estimate the direction of a change; Xn is expressed
as 5
Xn =
{
µ+ Yn, n = 1, . . . ,m+ k
∗ − 1
µ+ Yn + I, n = m+ k
∗, . . .
(5)
where µ, M ∈ R, represent the mean parameters before
and after the unknown time of possible change k∗ ∈ N∗
respectively. The term m denotes the length of an initial
training period during which there is no change in the mean
(µ1 = · · · = µm). In the form of a statistical hypothesis test,
the on-line problem is posed as,
H0 : I = 0
H1 : I 6= 0.
(6)
The on-line detection belongs to the category of stopping time
procedures, in which for a chosen detector TS(m, k) and a
given threshold F (m, k) we define the stopping time as:
τ(m) =
{
min{k ∈ N : |TS(m, k)|> F (m, k)}
∞, otherwise . (7)
It is necessary to have limm→∞ P{τm <∞|H0} = a, en-
suring that the probability of false alarm is asymptotically
bounded by α ∈ (0, 1), and, limm→∞ P{τm <∞|H1} = 1,
ensuring that under H1 the asymptotic power is unity. Fulfill-
ing these condition, the threshold F (m, k) was defined as,
F (m, k) = cagγ(m, k), (8)
where the critical value ca is determined from the asymptotic
distribution of the detector under H0 and the asymptotic
behavior achieved by letting m→∞. The weight function,
gγ(m, k) =
√
m
(
1 +
k
m
)(
k
k +m
)γ
(9)
depends on the sensitivity parameter γ ∈ [0, 1/2). The on-line
phase use the standard CUSUM detector, given by:
Γ(m, k) =
1
ω̂m
(
m+k∑
i=m+1
Xi − k
m
m∑
i=1
Xi
)
(10)
where ω̂m denotes the asymptotic variance, that captures the
serial dependence between observations.
The corresponding threshold is FΓ(m, k) = cΓagγ(m, k)
and the critical value is defined as:
lim
m→∞
P{τm <∞} = lim
m→∞
P
{
1
ω̂m
sup
16k6∞
|Γ(m, k)|
gγ(m, k)
> cΓa
}
=
{
sup
t∈[0,1]
W (t)
tγ
> cΓa
}
= α. (11)
The direction of change is estimated applying the MACD
indicator. This indicator is based on an exponential moving
average (EMA) filter. More details about this indicator can be
found in previous works [8] [9].
C. Overall algorithm
Summarizing, the overall algorithm has 5 main steps:
• Step 1: define a finite monitoring window k > 0 from a
starting time instance ms,
• Step 2: apply the off-line algorithm for the whole histor-
ical period h = {1, . . . ,ms}. If no changes are detected,
set m = h, conversely, the training sample becomes
m = {cplast, . . . ,ms}, where cplast is the last off-line
CP detected.
• Step 3: apply the on-line procedure TS(m, k) on the
interval ms,ms + k. If an on-line CP (cˆp
∗) is detected,
the on-line process stops. Conversely, cˆp∗ = 0, the
monitoring ends and proceeds to Step 5.
• Step 4: define kcp = cˆp
∗ as a CP and apply the trend
indicator. If TI(kcp > 0), announce an upward change.
Conversely, announce a downward change.
• Step 5: Set a new starting point for the monitoring period.
If kcp > 0, set ms = kcp + d where d is a constant
value defining a period assuming no change, else, set
ms = mh.
IV. METHODS
We employed the CP algorithm in [8] in SDWSNs under
FDFF and FNI attacks. We simulated grid topologies with 36
and 100 nodes, varying the number of attackers in the network
(5% and 20%). Each simulation runs during 10 hours and each
scenario was replicated 30 times. During the first 8 hours the
network operated normally, then the attack is triggered. The
choice of 8 hours was made because empirically it was seen
that we needed at least 250 samples for the training period
and we obtained one sample every 2 minutes. The simulations
were performed using the COOJA simulator [15] and sky
motes. The MAC layer was the IEEE 802.15.4, configured
to work without radio duty cycle (nullrdc_driver). The
data sink received the application data, while the management
sink received performance metrics information. Notice that
the SDN controller is a different node from the sink. Table I
depicts the simulation parameters.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation parameters
Topology Square grid
Number of nodes 36 and 100
Simulation duration 36000 s
Node boot interval [0, 1] s
Number of sinks 2
Sinks position Middle of the grid edge
Data traffic rate 1 packet every 30 seconds
Management traffic rate 1 packet every two minutes
Data payload size 10 bytes
Management payload size 10 bytes
Data traffic start time [2, 3] min
Radio module power 0 dB
Distance between neighbors 50 m
Attacks begins after 28800 s
IT-SDN parameters
Controller position center
ND protocol Collect-based
Link metric ETX
CD protocol none
Flow setup source routed
Route calculation algorithm Dijkstra
Route recalculation threshold 10%
Flow setup types regular or source routed
Flow table size 10 entries
We analyzed the data packets delivery rate and the control
packets overhead. The delivery rate was calculated by dividing
the total number of packets successfully received by the total
number of packets sent. The control packets overhead was
quantified as the total amount of control packets sent. Those
metrics were updated every two minutes.
The metrics measuring the performance of the intrusion de-
tection algorithm are: i) detection rate (DR); ii) false positive
rate (FPR); iii) false negative rate (FPR); iv) detection time
median (DTM), indicating the median of the time instances
elapsed from the launch of the attack to the instance it was
identified; and v) median absolute deviation (MAD). The
detection rate is the ratio between the correctly detected
attacks and the total number of attacks. The false positive rate
is the ratio between the number of attack events classified as
attack and the total number of attack events. The false negative
rate is the ratio between attack events classified as non-attack
event and the number of attack events. The detection time
median is the median of the number of samples required to
detect the attack. The median absolute deviation measures the
variability of the detection times and is calculated as shown
in (12), where Xi is the detection time for replication i, and
X˜ is the median of all the detection times,
MAD = median(|Xi − X˜ |) (12)
The delivery rate and control overhead time series were ana-
lyzed for three monitoring windows and three critical values.
We used monitoring periods K ∈ {50, 100, 150} samples.
This means that the test statistic is run over K samples to
extract changes in the mean value. As critical values we used
α ∈ {90%, 95%, 99%}. Finally, in this analysis, we discarded
the first 15 samples because during this time the network is
bootstrapping.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this Section we present and analyze the simulation
results. In Section V-A we compare the FDFF attack detection
performance when monitoring the data packets delivery rate
and the control overhead. In Section V-B we repeat this
analysis for the FNI attack.
A. FDFF attack detection
Tables II and III summarize the FDFF attack detection
results when 5% of nodes are attackers. The results show
that when monitoring the data packets delivery rate, the DR
is between 57% and 73% for 36 nodes, and between 60% and
83% for 100 nodes. The results when monitoring the control
packets overhead show two main points: (i) the algorithm
has the same detection performance if configured with a
monitoring period K of 50 or 150 samples, and (ii) when
the monitoring period is configured as K = 100 samples we
obtained a DR between 97% and 100%.
Comparing the FPR and the FNR metrics, we observe that
the number of cases classified as false negative is higher
than the number of cases classified as false positive. This
means, it is more common for the algorithm not to detect a
change in the metrics when the network is under attack than to
detect a suspicious change in a network without attackers. For
example, looking at the results when monitoring the control
overhead in Table II, only in one out of nine cases the FPR
was different than zero. Conversely, the FNR was different
than zero in six of nine cases.
The DTM (detection time median) results show that when
monitoring the control packets overhead, the attack detection
is faster than when monitoring the delivery rate in all the
cases. When monitoring the data packets delivery rate, the
DTM is between 31 and 37 samples for 36 nodes, and between
20 and 31 samples for 100 nodes. When monitoring the
control packets overhead, the DTM is between 9 and 19
samples for 36 nodes, and between 10 and 19 samples for
100 nodes. The fastest detection is obtained monitoring the
control packets overhead using a monitoring period of 100
samples, highlighted in red color.
Tables IV and V summarize the FDFF attack detection
results when 20% of nodes are attackers. In the case of 36
TABLE II
FDFF ATTACK DETECTION, 36 NODES, 5% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 31 33 31 31 37 33 31 31 31
MAD 4 6 4 8 9 10 4 4 4
DR 63 67 67 57 70 63 67 73 70
FPR 7 10 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNR 30 23 27 43 30 37 33 27 30
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 19 16 18 12 9 11 19 16 18
MAD 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3
DR 67 73 67 100 97 100 67 73 67
FPR 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
FNR 33 27 33 0 0 0 33 27 33
TABLE III
FDFF ATTACK DETECTION, 100 NODES, 5% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 24 26 27 22 20 21 29 31 31
MAD 7 6 13 9 10 11 13 9 15
DR 60 67 67 77 83 73 63 67 63
FPR 23 20 20 10 7 13 0 3 7
FNR 17 13 13 13 1 13 37 30 30
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 19 17 19 13 10 12 19 17 19
MAD 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
DR 60 73 63 100 100 100 60 73 63
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNR 40 27 37 0 0 0 40 27 37
nodes, the DR is between 73% and 83% when monitoring the
data packets delivery rate, and between 87% and 100% when
monitoring the control packets overhead. In terms of detection
time, the best DTM when monitoring the data packets delivery
rate was 24 samples and the DTM when monitoring the
control packets overhead was 5 samples. Configuring the
monitoring period in 100 we obtain the best DTM, but there
is a drop in the DR if compared with the cases when using
monitoring periods of 50 and 150 samples.
The results for 100 nodes show it is possible to obtain a
DR of 100% monitoring any of the metrics, but there are
significant differences in the detection time. The DTM when
monitoring the control overhead is between 3 and 4 samples,
while when monitoring the data packets delivery rate the
DTM is between 7 and 15 samples. Considering the earliest
TABLE IV
FDFF ATTACK DETECTION, 36 NODES, 20% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 28 28 28 30 24 28 29 28 28
MAD 5 8 6 11 7 8 6 5 8
DR 77 80 73 73 83 73 77 80 77
FPR 3 07 7 0 3 0 0 3 0
FNR 20 13 20 27 13 27 23 17 23
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
M 8 7 7 5 5 5 8 7 7
MAD 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
DR 100 100 100 97 87 97 100 100 100
FPR 0 0 0 3 13 3 0 0 0
FNR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
detection with the highest DR for both monitoring metrics, it
occurs when using a monitoring period of 100 samples. For
both cases the DR obtained was 97%. In terms of FPR and
FNR, the best performance was obtained when monitoring the
control overhead and using a monitoring period of 50 and 150
samples. Monitoring the control overhead using a monitoring
window of 100 samples provides a FPR between 3% and 10%.
Summarizing, the algorithm is able to detect the FDFF
attack using either the data packet packets delivery rate or
the control packets overhead as inputs. Notably, the algorithm
obtaines a DR of 100% with both metrics when 20% of
nodes behave as attackers. However, aiming for the quickest
detection captured through the detection time median, the
algorithm achieved far better results when monitoring the
control packets overhead in all scenarios. This is a direct
consequence of the type of the attack; the attacker creates
multiple flow rule request packets to increase the packet traffic
and the controller processing overhead. After some time, the
flow table of the nodes around the attacker start to saturate,
affecting the data packets delivery rate. This means that the
change in the delivery will be detected only after the tables
saturation; on the contrary, the number of control packets start
to change immediately after the attack is triggered.
B. FNI attack detection
Tables VI and VII summarize the FNI attack detection
results when 5% of nodes are attackers. Opposite to the FDFF
attack results, the algorithm obtained a better performance
detecting the FNI attack when monitoring the data packets
delivery rate. In the case of 36 nodes, the DR when monitoring
the data packets delivery rate is between 80% and 93%, and
the DR when monitoring the control packets overhead is
between 23% and 33%. In the case of 100 nodes, the DR when
monitoring the data packets delivery rate is between 83%
and 93%, and the DR when monitoring the control packets
overhead is between 30% and 70%. This means, even the best
TABLE V
FDFF ATTACK DETECTION, 100 NODES, 20% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 15 13 14 8 7 7 15 14 14
MAD 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 5
DR 100 93 100 97 93 97 100 97 97
FPR 0 7 0 3 7 3 0 3 3
FNR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
MAD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DR 100 97 100 97 90 97 100 97 100
FPR 0 3 0 3 10 3 0 3 0
FNR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE VI
FNI ATTACK DETECTION, 36 NODES, 5% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 7 6 7 8 7 6 7 6 6
MAD 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4
DR 93 83 93 93 80 93 93 83 87
FPR 0 10 0 0 13 0 0 10 7
FNR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 28 25 27 35 26 33 28 25 27
MAD 6 7 9 4 3 5 6 7 9
DR 27 33 27 20 27 23 27 33 27
FPR 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNR 70 63 70 80 73 77 73 67 73
DR when monitoring the control packets overhead is under
the worse DR when monitoring the data packets delivery rate.
Also, the results show that using a critical value of 90%,
we can obtain a negligible FPR (in our simulation calculated
zero). With respect to the DTM, the best result was obtained
by monitoring the data packets delivery rate and the control
packets overhead were 6 and 25 samples, respectively. This
means the algorithm detects the attack four times faster when
monitoring the data packets delivery rate. For 100 nodes, the
best DTM when monitoring the data packets delivery rate
remains in 6 samples, but when monitoring the control packets
overhead it is 29 samples.
Lastly, Tables VIII and IX summarize the FNI attack
detection results when 20% of nodes are attackers. For 36
nodes, the results remain similar to the case of 5% of nodes are
TABLE VII
FNI ATTACK DETECTION, 100 NODES, 5% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
MAD 4 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 4
DR 87 93 83 83 83 83 83 90 87
FPR 13 7 17 17 17 17 13 10 13
FNR 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 34 29 33 35 37 37 34 29 33
MAD 7 7 7 10 7 8 7 8 8
DR 63 70 67 30 47 37 63 70 67
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNR 37 30 33 70 53 63 37 30 33
attackers. In the case of 100 nodes, the DR when monitoring
the data packets delivery rate is between 97% and 100%, and
the DR when monitoring the control packets delivery rate is
between 93% and 97%. About the DTM, the results for the
scenarios when monitoring the data packets delivery rate are
between 4 and 9 samples. The results for this same metric
when monitoring the control packets overhead are between
24 and 26 samples. This means, for grid topologies with 100
nodes where 20% of nodes are attackers, we obtain similar
DRs regardless of the monitoring metric, but when monitoring
the delivery rate the detection is at least 3 times faster.
Summarizing our findings, the algorithm is able to detect
the FNI attack monitoring either the data packet packets
delivery rate or the control packets overhead. Then, comparing
the detection performance based on the detection rate and
the detection time median, the algorithm obtained a far better
performance when monitoring the data packets delivery rate
in all scenarios. This effect is directly related to the type of
the attack; in the FNI attack, the attackers intercept the control
packets that contain neighbor information, modify them, and
then forward them to the controller. This means this attack can
lead to a network misconfiguration using few control packets.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
SDWSNs are exposed to new security threats that may not
affect traditional WSNs. Recent proposals in the literature for
the identification of DDoS attacks in SDWSN do not always
consider “restricted” networks and there is also the need to
improve the solutions’ performance. In this work we provide
a solution for DDoS attack detection for SDWSN. We identify
an attack by monitoring changes in the mean values of two
metrics, the network data packets delivery rate and the control
packets overhead. To detect a change in either metric due to
a DDoS attack, we use state-of-the-art non-parametric and
on-line change point detection algorithms [8]. We performed
TABLE VIII
FNI ATTACK DETECTION, 36 NODES, 20% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 7
MAD 2 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 2
DR 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 26 24 26 26 24 27 26 24 26
MAD 8 7 7 17 11 13 8 7 7
DR 57 70 60 43 63 57 57 70 60
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNR 43 30 40 57 37 43 43 30 40
TABLE IX
FNI ATTACK DETECTION, 100 NODES, 20% ATTACKERS
Data packets delivery rate
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 9 10 10 8 9 8 10 12 11
MAD 5 8 7 4 6 4 5 9 8
DR 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
FNR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Control overhead
K 50 100 150
α 90 95 99 90 95 99 90 95 99
DTM 27 24 26 26 25 25 27 24 26
MAD 6 3 6 6 6 6 6 3 6
DR 93 97 97 93 97 93 93 97 97
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNR 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3 3
experiments for two SDWSN DDoS attacks, in topologies of
36 and 100 nodes, and with varying number of attackers. The
attacks implemented were the FDFF and the FNI.
Our results showed that it is feasible to detect those
attacks by monitoring either the data packets delivery rate
or control packets metrics. However, targeting the quickest
detection possible, far superior detection performance was
achieved for the FDFF when monitoring the control packets
overhead. Conversely, results showed a far better performance
in detecting the FNI attack when monitoring the data packets
delivery rate. In either cases, the detection rate increased to
even 100% with increasing attack intensity, while the agility of
the detection is noteworthy, with either attack identified within
3−10 samples from its launch. Notably, different metrics have
been shown to be better indicators for different types of attack,
allowing to detect not only the existence, but, potentially the
type of the attack.
As the detector’s algorithmic complexity is linear to the
size of the network and the number of metrics monitored,
the proposed approach could scale to include other metrics.
In future work, we will test the algorithm monitoring the
change of other network metrics to see if we can improve the
detection performance. We would like to test the algorithm
analyzing the metrics by regions or clusters to obtain more
information about the attacker location. Also, we will repeat
the experiments reducing the simulator Tx/Rx success ratio.
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